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CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON THE
EXECUTION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT

Lyn Entzeroth*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Reversing a decision it had issued only thirteen years earlier,' the United
States Supreme Court declared on June 20, 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia,2 that the
execution of mentally retarded 3 criminal defendants violates the Cruel and

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., University of
Wisconsin (1982); J.D., Tulane Law School (1987). I would like to thank Jill Reamer and Jonathan
Collins for their research assistance with this article.
1. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (plurality) (holding in 1989 that the Court
"cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded
person.., simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone"), overruled in part by, Atkins v. Va.,
122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
2. 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
3. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines mental retardation as a
significant sub-average of intellectual function accompanied with "significant limitations in adaptive
functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
sociallinterpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work,
leisure, health and safety." Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 39-40 (4th ed., Am.
Psychiatric Assn. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IVI. Moreover, to fit within the DSM-IV definition of
mental retardation, one's intellectual and adaptive deficits must manifest themselves by the time the
individual is eighteen years old. Id. at 39-40.
Sub-average intellectual functioning is based on Intelligence Quotient or IQ scores. The mean
score for intelligence is an 10 score of 100. The DSM-IV rates the following 10 scores as indicative of
mental retardation:
IQ 50-55 to approximately 70: mild mental retardation
IQ 35-40 to 50-55: moderate mental retardation
IQ 20-25 to 35-40: severe mental retardation
IQ below 20-25: profound mental retardation

Id. An IQ score of 70 is two standard deviations below the mean IQ score of 100. Id. The DSM-IV
also notes that individuals with IQ scores in the range of 71 to 75 may be mentally retarded if they have
significant deficits in adaptive functioning.
Employing a test similar, but not identical, to the one set out in the DSM-IV, the American
Association on Mental Retardation ("AAMR") considers an individual mentally retarded if he or she
has: (1) an IQ below 70-75; (2) concurrently existing with limitations in two or more adaptive skill
areas; and (3) which is manifested by age eighteen. See Am. Assn. on Mental Retardation, Mental
Retardation: Definition, Classification and Systems of Support 5, 25 (9th ed., Am. Assn. on Mental
Retardation 1992). For a more in-depth discussion of the attributes of mental retardation and the
standards employed to determine this disability, see Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded
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Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 4 The Court's remarkable turn-around on this issue showcases the
Court's modern interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as well as its current
death penalty jurisprudence. This article will trace the evolution of this area of
constitutional law, discuss previous rulings on the imposition of the death penalty on
mentally retarded defendants, consider the Court's recent decision in Atkins, and
examine the impact Atkins may have on mentally disabled individuals currently on death
row as well as those individuals who in the future may face the possibility of being
sentenced to death.

II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

To place in context the Supreme Court's decision to prohibit the execution
of mentally retarded criminal defendants requires a brief overview of the history
of the Eighth Amendment and the Supreme Court's interpretation of this
constitutional provision.5 The idea that a punishment should be graduated to fit
the crime can trace its roots to the Magna Carta, which contains language that
fines imposed should be "in accordance with the degree of the offense.",6 British
courts extended this proportionality requirement to punishments in the 1600s.7
The prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" first "appeared in the
English Bill of Rights of 1689, which was drafted by the British Parliament at the
accession of William and Mary.",8 The English Bill of Rights provides, "That
excessive bail ought not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." 9 This prohibition grew out of excesses that
occurred during the reign of the Stuarts where illegal prosecutions occurred,
unqualified jurors sat in judgment of British subjects, excessive fines and bail were
imposed, and "illegal and cruel punishments inflicted."1 ° The illegal and cruel

Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the
Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 911, 913-18 (2001).
4. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. Const.
amend. XIII.
5. For interesting discussions on the Eighth Amendment and its historical roots, see Stephen T.
Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 69
Tenn. L. Rev. 41, 41-59 (2000); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:"
The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 839, 839-44 (1969).
6. Magna Carta T$ 20-22 (reprinted in Neil H. Cogan, Contexts of the Constitution 660 (Found.
Press 1999)).
7. See Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rpt. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 1615) (Croke, J.) ("[I]mprisonment ought
always to be according to the quality of the offence"), cited by Justice Scalia in Part I of his opinion in
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991). In Part I of his opinion in Harmelin, Justice Scalia
rejected the idea that the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality requirement. Id. at 963-85.
Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in this part of Justice Scalia's opinion in Harmelin.
8. English Bill of Rights 10 (reprinted in Cogan, supra n. 6, at 689); see Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S.
153, 169 (1976) (citing Granucci, supra n. 5, at 840).
9. English Bill of Rights, 1 10 (Dec. 13, 1689) (reprinted in Cogan, supra n. 6, at 689); see Gregg,
428 U.S. at 153 (citing Granucci, supra n. 5, at 840).
10. English Bill of Rights TT 1-12 (listing grievances reprinted in Cogan, supra n. 6, at 687-88).
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punishments involved torture, such as breaking on the wheel and dissection.1 The
restriction on fines and punishments in the English Bill of Rights sought to
prohibit fines or punishments that were not authorized by law, that were
disproportionate to the crime, or punishments that employed the use of torture.12
Little more than a century later, the framers of the United States
Constitution incorporated this "cruel and unusual punishment" proscription into
the Eighth Amendment. Mirroring the English Bill of Rights, the Eighth
Amendment, which was adopted in 1791, provides, "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted." The language of this amendment received little debate at the time of its
adoption 3 However, commentators have concluded that the amendment was
intended to prohibit forms of punishment outlawed at the time the Constitution
was drafted 14 and to prohibit torture and other barbarous forms of punishment. 5
During the nineteenth century, the Court only availed itself of a few
opportunities to comment upon the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. It is nonetheless evident that the Court construed the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit not only torture, but also otherwise legal punishment that
was carried out in a torturous manner. For example, in Wilkerson v. Utah, 6 the
Court noted that "[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the
extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of

11. See Granucci, supra n. 5, at 852-53; see Mark Spatz, Student Author, Shame's Revival.- An
UnconstitutionalRegression, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 827, 834-39 (2002).
12. Id. The Magna Carta also contains language that fines imposed should be "in proportion to the
measure of the offence." Magna Carta 11 20-22 (reprinted in Cogan, supra n. 6, at 660).
13. See Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910). Justice McKenna writing for a majority of the
Court observed:
The [cruel and unusual punishment] provision received very little debate in Congress. We
find from the Congressional Register, p. 225, that Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, "objected to
the words 'nor- cruel and unusual punishment,' the import of them being too indefinite."
Mr. Livermore opposed the adoption of the clause saying:
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no
objection to it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary.
What is meant by the terms "excessive bail?" Who are to be the judges? What is
understood by "excessive fines?" It lays with the court to determine. No cruel and
unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains
often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we, in future, to
be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more
lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be
invented, it would be very prudent in the legislature to adopt it; but until we have some
security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary
laws by any declaration of this kind.
The question was put on the clause, and it was agreed to by a considerable majority.
Id. at 368-69.
14. Id.
15. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169-71. One commentator posits that the framers of the Constitution
misinterpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the English Bill of Rights and did not
comprehend that the English cruel and unusual punishment prohibition included excessive
punishment, and not merely torturous punishment. Granucci, supra n. 5, at 865.
16. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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torture .... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by
that amendment to the Constitution."' 7 Likewise, in In re Kemmler, 8 the Court
stated that even though the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause did not, in and
of itself, bar the death penalty, under certain circumstances the application of the
death penalty or the method of its infliction might violate this constitutional
protection.
As the twentieth century dawned, the Supreme Court delved more directly
into the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 9 In 1910, the Court explicitly
considered the scope of the Amendment in Weems v. United States.20 At issue in
Weems was the imposition of a sentence of fifteen years in prison in chains at hard
and painful labor and a forfeiture of significant civil rights imposed by the Court
of First Instance for the City of Manila for the offense of falsifying a public
document. 2' The Court observed that the punishment imposed on Weems for his
relatively minor offense would "amaze those who have formed their conception of
the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of the
American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that
22
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.,
Indeed, the Court noted that no American state imposed a similar punishment for
such an offense, and that the federal government imposed a sentence of not more
than two years for a similar crime. 23 After contrasting these sentences with the
one imposed on Weems, the Court concluded that the punishment imposed on
Weems was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment ... unusual in its character. Its
punishments come under the condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both on account
24
of their degree and kind.,

17. Id. at 135-36.
18. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
19. Weems, 217 U.S. at 366-82; see Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at 922-23 (discussing Weems, 217 U.S. 349).
20. 217 U.S. at 349.
21. In 1910, the Phillipines were under the constitutional jurisdiction of the United States. Weems,
217 U.S. at 367-68. At issue in Weems was the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Philippines' Bill of Rights. Id. at 367. The Court noted that the provision "was taken from the
Constitution of the United States, and must have the same meaning." Id. (citing Kepner v. U.S., 195
U.S. 100, 121-25 (1904)). As Justice White noted in his dissent:
The Philippine Bill of Rights, which is construed and applied, is identical with the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of the 8th Amendment. Because of this identity it is now decided
that it is necessary to give to the Philippine Bill of Rights the meaning properly attributable
to the provision on the same subject found in the 8th Amendment, as, in using the language
of that Amendment in the statute, it is to be presumed that Congress intended to give to the
words their constitutional significance. The ruling now made, therefore, is an interpretation
of the 8th Amendment, and announces the limitation which that Amendment imposes on
Congress when exercising its legislative authority to define and punish crime. The great
importance of the decision is hence obvious.
Id. at 383-84.
22. Id. at 366-67. Although Weems appeared to apply a proportionality review, Justice Scalia
disputes that proportionality is an element of Eighth Amendment analysis, at least in non-capital cases.
See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 963-85.
23. Weems, 217 U.S. at 377, 380.
24. Id. at 377.
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Weems is particularly noteworthy because in finding the
imposed on Weems violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court
declined to limit the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to
of punishment outlawed at the time the Constitution was drafted. 2'
Court found that:

punishment
specifically
those forms
Rather, the

[A] principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions....
In the application of a
constitution, therefore,
our
contemplation
cannot
only
be
of what has been, but of
26
what may be.

The Court observed that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause "may be
therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice. 27
According to the Court, public opinion and a humane justice would not tolerate
the hard labor, excessive and disproportionate sentence imposed on Weems.
Thirty-four years later in Trop v. Dulles,28 the Court expanded the
constitutional principles articulated in Weems. At issue in Trop was whether the
punishment of denationalization for the crime of desertion was a cruel and
unusual punishment. In posing this issue, Chief Justice Earl Warren asked
"whether this penalty [of denationalization] subjects the individual to a fate
forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment."2 9 In answering this question, the Court acknowledged that the
precise contours of the Eighth Amendment had not been "detailed by this
Court., 30 Yet, tracing the roots of the Eighth Amendment to the English Bill of
Rights and the Magna Carta, the Court found that "[t]he basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State
has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards."3 1 To achieve this end, "[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. 32 Relying on this "evolving standards of
decency" concept, the Court observed that the international community was in
virtual agreement that stripping a person of citizenship should not be imposed as a
form of punishment for the crime of desertion.33 Moreover, the Court found that
denationalization was devastating in its effect on the individual as it rendered him
stateless and at the mercy of the country where he was located. 34 Based on these

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 378.
356 U.S. 86 (1958). For general discussion on Trop, see Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at 923-24.

29. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102-03.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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factors, and the "evolving standard of decency" test it had articulated, the Court
concluded that stripping Trop of his United States citizenship violated the Eighth
35
Amendment.
The trend of expanding the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
continued during the early 1960s. Four years after Trop, the Court extended the
Clause to the states, finding that a sentence of ninety days in county jail for being
a drug addict violated the Eighth Amendment. 36 Because drug addiction is an
illness, the Court reasoned, "a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as
a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or
been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual
'
punishment. 37
As the Court noted, "[t]o be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is
not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the
question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a
cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold. 38
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court directly considered the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause in the context of modern death penalty statutes. In 1972, in
Furman v. Georgia,39 the Court, by a vote of five-to-four, struck down the thenexisting death penalty statutes in effect around the country. Each Justice issued a
separate opinion on this issue, but a majority of the Justices found that death
penalty statutes that gave the jury unfettered discretion to determine who would
live and who would die violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 40 As
a result of this decision, death penalty statutes across the country were rendered
invalid.
Rather than doing away with capital punishment, states responded to
Furman by revamping their death penalty statutes. Four years after Furman, the
Court considered these new statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,4' and four companion
cases, 42 and found that the death penalty statutes of Georgia, Florida and Texas
were constitutional. These pivotal cases set out the parameters and conditions
governing the modern death penalty system, which in addition to other procedural
safeguards require not only that a jury's sentencing 43 decision be narrowed and

35. Id.
36. Robinson v. Cal., 370 U.S. 660 (1962); see Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at 924-25.
37. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
38. Id.
39. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The previous year, a majority of the Court held that the death
penalty did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McGautha v. Cal., 402
U.S. 183, 196 (1971).
40. See Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Capital Punishment and the Judicial Process 128-29 (2d
ed., Carolina Academic Press 2001).

41. 428 U.S. 153, 168 (1976).
42. Jurek v. Tex., 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas' death penalty statute); Proffitt v. Fla., 428
U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida's death penalty statute); Woodson v. N.C., 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(striking down North Carolina's mandatory death penalty scheme); Roberts v. La., 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
(striking down Louisiana's mandatory death penalty scheme).
43. In another landmark decision issued this Term, the Court found that a defendant has an

absolute right to have a jury, and not a judge, decide whether he or she should be sentenced to death.
Ring v. Ariz., 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
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rationally guided," but also mandated that the jury be allowed to exercise mercy
in individual cases based on the mitigating circumstances of the crime and/or the
defendant.45 In sifting through the various post-Furman statutes, the Court
acknowledged that the death penalty is different from all other 46criminal penalties.
As a plurality of the Court noted in Woodson v. North Carolina.
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
47
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Based on the difference in the penalty of death, 48 and following the
reasoning of Weems and Trop, the Court then applied the evolving standard of
decency test to the death penalty statutes at issue. In making their evaluation, the
Court stated it was to assess the "contemporary values concerning the infliction of
a challenged sanction .... [T]his assessment does not call for a subjective
judgment. It requires, rather, that we look to objective indicia that reflect the
public attitude toward a given sanction. 4 ' After this examination, the Court then
had to determine whether the punishment at issue was in "accord with 'the dignity
of man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.' This
means, at least, that the punishment not be 'excessive.' 50 The question of
excessiveness has two elements. "First, the punishment must not involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, 51 which means that the death penalty52
deterrence.
as imposed must advance the penological goals of retribution and

44. The modern death penalty statutes set forth criteria that are intended to provide a rational
means for narrowing the class of individuals that may be sentenced to death. There has been
considerable debate about whether the death penalty statutes achieve this goal, or whether it is even an
obtainable objective. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
45. In order for the imposition of the death penalty to comport with the United States Constitution,
the capital defendant must be allowed to present and the jury be allowed to consider all relevant
mitigating evidence about the defendant and the circumstances of the crime. See Penry, 492 U.S. at
317-18 (plurality); Eddings v. Okla., 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978). Justice Scalia finds this prong of the modern death penalty system not to be required by the
Constitution and inconsistent with the Court's holding in Furman. Walton v. Ariz., 497 U.S. 639, 65674 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled, Ring v. Ariz., 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002).
46. 428 U.S.280.
47. Id. at 305.
48. Justice Scalia has criticized severely the Court's modern death penalty jurisprudence. See
Walton, 497 U.S. at 656-74. In his concurring opinion in Walton, Justice Scalia asserts that the two
objectives of the modern death penalty system-(1) to ensure channeled, rational narrowing of those
defendants who may be subjected to the death penalty, and (2) to allow a wide range of mitigating
evidence to be used in deciding whether ultimately to impose the death penalty-are inconsistent and
irreconcilable. Id. at 664-65.
49. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 183-86. The Court has found that retribution and deterrence are two legitimate goals
advanced by the death penalty. However, most studies show that the death penalty does not deter
capital murder. See Coyne & Entzeroth, supra n. 40, at 25, 31.
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"Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of
53
the crime.,
Since Gregg, the Court has held that the imposition of the death penalty for
certain behavior is an excessive punishment that is cruel and unusual under the
Constitution. For example, in Coker v. Georgia,54 the Court found that the
imposition of the death penalty for rape of an adult woman was an excessive
punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment. In large measure, the Court
based this conclusion on the fact that among the constitutionally valid postFurman death penalty statutes, only Georgia's statute provided the death penalty
for the rape of an adult woman.55 The lack of similar legislation from other states
provided objective evidence that the punishment was out of step with the values of
57 the Court struck down a Florida
the nation. 6 Likewise, in Enmund v. Florida,
statute authorizing the imposition of the death penalty for felony-murder
accomplices who did not take a life, attempt to take a life, or intend to take a life.",
In so holding, the Court found persuasive the fact that only eight other death
penalty states allowed the imposition of the death penalty in such cases. 59 In
addition to this objective evidence, the Enmund Court found that imposing the
death penalty under such circumstances would not advance the legitimate goals of
retribution and deterrence, but would only inflict purposeless
and needless pain
6
and suffering, which is intolerable under the Constitution. 0
In the 1980s, the Court also exempted two classes of people from the death
penalty. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,61 the Court exempted children under the age
of sixteen from the death penalty. Among the critical facts in that case was that
eighteen death penalty states specifically prohibited the execution of children who
were under the age of sixteen at the time they committed capital murder. This
legislative prohibition supported the conclusion that the country had found the62
execution of children to be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency.
However, the following year, the Court found that sixteen-year-olds could be

53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. The Court noted in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977):
In sustaining the imposition of the death penalty in Gregg, however, the Court firmly
embraced the holdings and dicta from prior cases, Furman, Robinson, Trop, and Weems, to
the effect that the Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments that are "barbaric"
but also those that are "excessive" in relation to the crime committed. Under Gregg, a
punishment is "excessive" and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime. A punishment might fail the test on either ground.
Id. (citations omitted).
54. 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977).
55. Id. at 594-95.
56. Id.
57. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
58. Id. at 789-801.
59. Id. at 789-93.
60. Id. at 798-99.
61. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
62. Id. at 829.
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subject to the death penalty in part because only fifteen death penalty states
63
statutorily prohibited the execution of these juveniles.
The Court has also held that the government may not execute someone who
insane
at the time he or she is to be executed. 64 No state allows the execution of
is
someone who is insane at the time of the execution; indeed, at the time the
Constitution was drafted, the common law prohibited such executions.65 Although
the legislative disapproval of inflicting the death penalty on the insane was critical
in discerning contemporary standards of decency, the nature and effect of insanity
and its impact on its victim also played a key role. As Justice Marshall so
passionately opined, "Whether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear and
pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself
vengeance, the restriction finds
from the barbarity of exacting mindless
66
enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.

III.

IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND PUNISHMENT
ON THE MENTALLY RETARDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANT

At the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted, the common law
exempted certain mentally disabled individuals from criminal liability, which
necessarily meant that such persons would be spared from the death penalty.67
For centuries, the common law has recognized that mental retardation is an
attribute that may affect an individual's capacity to be held liable for criminal
conduct or correspondingly be subjected to criminal punishment. In the late
1700s, an individual who was deemed an "idiot" in the eyes of the court was not
subject to criminal liability. 68 An "idiot" was described as "a person who cannot
account or number twenty pence, nor can tell who was his father or mother, nor
how old he is, etc., so as it may appear he' hath no understanding of reason what
shall be for his profit, or what for his lOSS. 69
By today's standards, an "idiot" would correspond to an individual with
severe or profound mental retardation. Only a small number of mentally retarded
individuals, perhaps five percent or less, are considered severely or profoundly
retarded, and the limitations of an individual with severe or profound mental

63. Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
64. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at 916. Although the
Constitution protects the insane from being executed, it did not protect Rickey Ray Rector, a man with
obvious and profound mental defects due to a severe head injury, who was executed by the State of
Arkansas during Bill Clinton's first campaign for the presidency. Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth,
Report Regarding Implementation of the American Bar Association's Recommendations and
Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Callingfor a Moratorium on Executions, 4 Geo. J. on
Fighting Pov. 3, 43-44 (1996). When the Arkansas prison officials served Rector his last meal, he saved
his dessert to be eaten after his execution. Id.
65. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 408-09.
66. Id. at 410.
67. For a general discussion on this topic, see Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at 916-18.
68. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331-32 (plurality).
69. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 414, 416 (1985) (quoting Sir William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 544-45 (4th ed.,
Meuthen & Co. 1966)); see Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2242 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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retardation are stark.7 ° An individual with severe mental retardation has an IQ
ranging between 20 and 40." The mean IQ is 100.72 The DSM-IV states that a
person with such a low IQ would suffer from at least two significant limitations in
adaptive functioning. Such limitations might include poor communication skills,
as well as difficulty in self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health and safety. 73 Given this disability, a severely retarded individual is likely to
attain little or no communication skills during early childhood years, although he
or she may learn to talk and perform basic self-care skills during her school
years.74 As an adult, the individual may be able to perform simple skills under
close supervision, but functions best in a group home or living with family.75 A
profoundly retarded individual is even more disabled with an IQ below 20 or 25.76
This individual will exhibit considerable deficits in sensorimotor functioning, and
will thrive best in a highly structured environment with constant supervision.77
As evidenced by the above descriptions of severe and profound mental
retardation, individuals suffering from such degrees of retardation experience
considerable functional deficits. Thus, it is understandable that the common law
found that an individual with either profound or severe mental retardation, i.e., an
individual who three centuries ago would have been classified as an "idiot," has
such a limited reasoning capacity that he or she could not be considered capable of
forming the requisite criminal intent to commit a criminal offense, nor could he or
she be considered capable of distinguishing between good and evil. 78 To a certain
extent, the law likened the capacity and culpability of such a disabled individual to
the mental abilities and moral culpability of a child. This rule of common law
served as the precursor to the modern insanity defense, 79 and on this basis,
profoundly and severely retarded individuals were exempt from criminal liability
at the time the United States Constitution was drafted. 80

70. DSM-IV, supra n. 3, at 40.
71. Id. There is some argument that the term "idiot" applies only to persons with IQs below 25.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 333 (plurality). Thus, arguably it is possible that an individual with severe mental
retardation could have been found criminally liable at the time the Eighth Amendment was drafted.
72. DSM-IV, supra n. 3, at 39.
73. Id. at 39-41.
74. Id. at 41.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. DSM-IV, supra n. 3, at 41-42.
78. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333 (plurality).
79. Id. at 332-33.
80. Ellis & Luckasson, supra n. 69, at 416; see Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
his dissent, Justice Scalia notes that the mentally retarded, although escaping criminal liability and
punishment, "were often committed to civil confinement or made wards of the State, thereby
preventing them from 'go[ing] loose, to the terror of the king's subjects."' ld. at 2260-61 (citation
omitted).
A more sinister view of the mentally retarded emerged in the early twentieth century. See
Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at 917. Segregation and even sterilization of the mentally retarded were some of
the ideas advocated. See e.g. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (infamously upholding Virginia
eugenics statute authorizing the sterilization of the mentally disabled). These views were soundly
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Today, under most circumstances, a judge or jury would find a severely or
profoundly retarded person exempt from criminal liability. At the outset, it is

likely that a jury would find an individual with such limited mental abilities
incompetent to stand trial. An individual is not competent to stand trial unless he

or she is capable of understanding the nature of the charges against him and is
capable of assisting in his defense.81 Someone who is profoundly or severely
retarded likely lacks one or both of these prerequisites. Moreover, mental
retardation is a permanent disability that cannot be ameliorated with medication,
and a mentally retarded defendant who is incompetent to stand trial due to his
retardation will not be amenable to medical treatment so as to be rendered
competent. However, even if a profoundly or severely retarded individual could
be found competent to stand trial, he or she most likely will be found exempt from
criminal liability under modern insanity statutes.82
The majority of mentally retarded persons are not severely or profoundly
retarded. Most mentally retarded persons are characterized by the medical
community as either mildly or moderately retarded. Individuals with mild or
moderate mental retardation have regularly been found competent to stand trial
83
and have been found sane for the purposes of imposing criminal liability.
Moreover, these individuals were not exempt from criminal liability at the time
the Constitution was drafted. Although subject to criminal liability, a mildly or
moderately retarded person suffers from a significant mental disability that
dramatically affects his life and his experience in the criminal justice system.
Approximately eight-five percent of mentally retarded persons are classified as

mildly retarded. 84 A mildly retarded individual has an IQ ranging between 50 or
55 and 70. 85 This IQ is two standard deviations below the mean IQ of 100.86 In

rejected and today most Americans accept the view that mental retardation rarely, if ever, causes
criminal behavior. Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at 917.
81. See Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Cooper v. Okla., 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (holding defendant
may bear the burden of proving incompetence but the standard of proof cannot be greater than a
preponderance of the evidence).
82. See e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-502(A) (West 2002) (insanity may be found "if at the time of
the commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such
severity that the person did not know the criminal act was wrong"); Ala. Code § 15-16-3 (2002) ("test
for insanity requires a showing that at the time of the commission of the crime, the defendant was
afflicted with a diseased mind to the extent that (1) she did not know right from wrong as applied to
the particular act in question, or (2) if she did have such knowledge, she nevertheless, by reason of the
duress of such mental disease had so far lost the power to select the right and to avoid doing the act in
question as that her free agency was at the time destroyed, and (3) that, at the same time, the crime
was so connected with such mental disease, in relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product
of it solely"); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 25 (applying McNaughten test); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-8-10t.5
(2002) ("person is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of the act as to be
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act is not accountable"); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 21, § 152 (West 2002) (at the "time of committing the act charged against them they were
incapable of knowing its wrongfulness").
83. For a general discussion on the definition of mental retardation, see Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at
913-18.
84. DSM-IV, supra n. 3, at 41. For a discussion on mild and moderate mental retardation, see
Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at 913-15.
85. DSM-IV, supra n. 3, at 39-40.
86. Id. at 39.
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addition, the mildly retarded person suffers from two significant limitations in
adaptive functioning. The manifestation of the disability occurs by age eighteen. 81
While the term "mild" is used to describe this disability, the disability is
substantial. For example, a mildly retarded individual will most likely be unable
to attain academic skills beyond the sixth grade level, 88 which plainly curtails the
scope of activities and employment he or she may enjoy. Although a mildly
retarded person may achieve skills adequate for self-support, he or she will
generally require supervision, guidance, and other support to live independently.89
A person with moderate mental retardation suffers even greater
limitations. 9° This person's IQ will range between 30 and 55. 9' He or she also
suffers from at least two significant deficits in adaptive functioning. The
manifestation of the disability also occurs by the time he or she is eighteen years
old. 92 Not only is a moderately retarded individual unlikely to attain academic
skills beyond the second grade level,93 but also during adolescence he or she may
experience difficulty recognizing social conventions and encounter problems in his
or her peer relationships. 94
Needless to say, mild and moderate mental retardation significantly affects a
person's experience with the criminal justice system. For example, one attribute
of mental retardation is an incomplete or immature concept of blame and/or
causation. 95 This characteristic can distort the mentally retarded criminal
defendant's understanding of his or her participation in a criminal act. 96 Other
attributes of mental retardation include limited communication skills, a desire to
answer questions so as to please the questioner, a desire to hide one's mental
retardation, the tendency to be easily led, a poor understanding of the
consequences of one's actions, poor impulse control, and a tendency to be
submissive.97 Moreover, a mentally retarded defendant is unlikely to fully
understand the cause and effect of his or her criminal actions, thus limiting his or
her ability to fully understand what he or she has done, or the effects of his or her
actions." These characteristics can have a tremendous impact on a mentally
retarded criminal suspect and may lead a mentally retarded defendant to confess
to an act he or she did not commit, 99 or to accept greater blame or responsibility
87. Id. at 39-40.
88. Id. at 41.
89. Id.
90. DSM-IV, supra n. 3, at 41. Approximately ten percent of mentally retarded persons are
moderately retarded.
91. Id. at 40.
92. Id. at 39-40.
93. Id. at 41.
94. Id.
95. Ellis & Luckasson, supra n. 69, at 445-52.
96. Morgan Cloud et al., Words without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally
RetardedSuspects, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 495, 512-13 (2002); Ellis & Luckasson, supra n. 69, at 437-40.
97. Cloud, supra n. 96, at 512-14; Ellis & Luckasson, supra n. 69, at 437-40.
98. Cloud, supra n. 96, at 510; Ellis & Luckasson, supra n. 69, at 437-40.
99. The case of Earl Washington demonstrates the risk of false confessions by innocent mentally
retarded criminal suspects. Washington, a mentally retarded African-American, was convicted and
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for criminal activity than he or she realistically should. A recent study revealed
that many mentally retarded criminal suspects do not even understand the
Miranda warnings, or the consequences of confessing to a criminal act.1°°

In

addition, after a mentally retarded suspect is charged with a criminal offense, the
inherent attributes of his or her disability may adversely affect his or her ability to
provide his or her lawyer with information that might aid in his or her defense or
that might be of use in seeking a lighter penalty. Plainly, the mentally retarded
individual faces unique problems and obstacles when charged with a criminal
offense.
IV.

EXECUTING THE MENTALLY RETARDED: THE PENRY DECISION

Although during the 1980s the Court excluded children under the age of
sixteen and the insane from the death penalty, 1 1 the Supreme Court explicitly
sanctioned the execution of the mentally retarded in Penry v. Lynaugh.' °2 At issue

in Penry was the imposition of the death penalty on Johnny Paul Penry, a young
man with an IQ between 50 and 63,103 which placed him in the mild to moderate
range of mental retardation.' ° Although a mildly retarded person may attain
skills up to the sixth grade level, Penry dropped out of school in the first grade.0 5
Moreover, during his early childhood, Penry's mentally ill mother repeatedly and
brutally abused him; this abuse included blows to Penry's head.' 6 After bouncing
in and out of state institutions, Penry eventually lived with his aunt. Penry's aunt

taught him to print his name; it took him a year to learn this most basic of skills.'0 7
As an adult, Penry could not read or write) °8
As a young man, Penry was convicted of rape and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in the Texas Department of Corrections. Not long after he was
released on parole for this first rape conviction, Penry raped and murdered

sentenced to death, based in part on his recanted confession that he had raped and murdered a young
woman. Years later, DNA conclusively demonstrated that Washington was innocent and he was set
free. James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty: What's DNA Got to Do with It?, 33 Colum. Hum.
Rights L. Rev. 527, 546 (2002); Paul T. Hourihan, Earl Washington's Confession: Mental Retardation
and the Law of Confessions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1471 (1995).
100. Cloud, supra n. 96, at 499 (finding virtually all mentally retarded suspects studied were
incapable of understanding the context of the interrogation, the text of the Miranda warnings, or the
consequences of waiving their rights).
101. See supra nn. 11-12.
102. Penry, 492 U.S. 302 (plurality).
103. For a more detailed discussion of the facts of the Penry case, see Entzeroth, supra n. 3, at 918-22;
Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-12 (plurality); Pet.'s Br. at 2-7, Penry v. Johnson, 2001 WL 237371 (Jan. 11,
2001) (10 tests conducted over a twenty-three-year period on Penry revealed an IQ between 51 and
63).
104. See supra nn. 3, 89-99 and accompanying text on discussion of DSM-IV classification and skill
levels.
105. Penry, 492 U.S. at 309 (plurality); Emily Fabrycki Reed, The Penry Penalty: Capital Punishment
and Offenders with Mental Retardation2 (U. Press Am. 1993).
106. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308-09 (plurality); Reed, supra n. 105, at 1; Pet. for Cert. at 18, Penry v.
Johnson, 2000 WL 33191345 (Oct. 20, 2000).
107. Penry, 492 U.S. at 309 (plurality).
108. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 492 U.S. 302
(1989) (plurality).
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Pamela Mosely Carpenter. 9 Carpenter was able to identify Penry as her attacker
before her death." Penry gave two confessions to the crime,"' and the state filed
capital murder charges against him. 112
A competency hearing" 3 was held to determine whether Penry was able to
understand the charges against him and was capable to assist in his defense."'
Evidence was presented regarding Penry's mental retardation and head injuries.
A psychologist who tested Penry advised the jury that "'there's a point at which
anyone with [Penry's] IQ is always incompetent, but, you know, this man is more
in the borderline range."' ' 5 The jury found him competent to stand trial.
At his capital murder trial, Penry contended he was insane at the time he
committed the murder and presented evidence of his mental retardation and brain
damage to support his defense." 6 The state responded with evidence showing
Penry was sane at the time of his crime; however, the state did appear to concede
that Penry's mental abilities were very limited."' The jury found Penry's insanity
defense unpersuasive and convicted him of capital murder.
The jury then turned to the question of punishment. In making its capital
sentencing determination, this Texas jury was required to answer the following
three questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;

(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased 18was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased."

An affirmative answer to all three questions would result in the imposition
of the death penalty." 9 The jury answered "yes" to all three questions, and Penry
was sentenced to death.
The United States Supreme Court decided to hear Penry's appeal of his
death sentence in order to answer two questions: (1) whether the sentencing
109. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307 (plurality) (relying upon the facts set forth by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Penry, 832 F.2d at 917); Reed, supra n. 105, at 2.
110. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307 (plurality).
111. See supra nn. 96-99 and accompanying text for discussion on confessions by the mentally
retarded.
112. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307 (plurality).
113. See supra nn. 80-82 and accompanying text for discussion of competency and mental
retardation.
114. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-08 (plurality).
115. Id. at 308.
116. See supra nn. 78-82 and accompanying text for discussion on insanity defense and mental
retardation.
117. Penry, 492 U.S. at 309 (plurality).
118. Id. at 310 (citing Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 37.071(2)(b) (1981 & Supp. 1989)).
119. See Jurek, 428 U.S. 262 (discussing Texas capital sentencing scheme):
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instructions adequately advised the jury that it should consider Penry's mental
retardation and other mental disabilities as evidence mitigating against the
imposition of the death penalty and to weigh this mitigating evidence in its
sentencing decision; and (2) whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded criminal defendant.1 2 0 The Court
answered the first question in favor of Penry, but rejected his cruel and unusual
punishment argument.
Justice O'Connor authored the Court's plurality opinion. In answering the
first question, she joined with Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
to find that the sentencing instructions were constitutionally defective because the
judge failed to advise the jury to consider Penry's mental retardation and abusive
12 1
childhood as evidence mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty.
22
Because of this deficiency, the Court remanded the case for resentencing.1
However, in answering the second question posed by Penry, Justice
O'Connor teamed up with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White, and
Kennedy to reject the argument that the imposition of the death penalty on the
mentally retarded violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.123 Justice Stevens, along with Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, vigorously dissented to this portion of Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion.
In evaluating Penry's cruel and unusual punishment claim, Justice O'Connor
echoed the standards discussed by the Court in Weems, Trop and Gregg that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that offend society's evolving sense of
decency. 2 4 She then articulated a two-part analysis, which followed the rationale
and analysis of Gregg, Ford, Coker, Edmund and Thompson. Essentially, Justice
O'Connor found that there were two issues to be considered in determining
whether the death penalty was excessive when imposed on a mentally retarded
defendant: (1) whether there is "objective evidence" demonstrating a national
consensus that the execution of the mentally retarded is a cruel and unusual
punishment; and (2) whether the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally
retarded offender provides a measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of
punishment and is proportionate to the crime.

120. Penry, 492 U.S. at 313 (plurality).
121. Id. at 314-28.
122. As a result of the Court's 1989 decision, Penry underwent a new sentencing hearing in 1990.
The jury again sentenced Penry to death. Penry sought relief from this sentence in both state and
federal court. Eventually, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Penry's claims. Again, Justice
O'Connor authored an opinion in which the Court found that the state trial court failed to properly
instruct the jury that Penry's mental retardation and evidence of childhood abuse were factors that
were to be considered as evidence mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty. Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796-804 (2001). Accordingly, Penry's case was once again remanded for a
proper sentencing trial. Id.
123. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328-40 (plurality); Id. at 350-51 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
124. Id. at 330-31 (plurality).
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Turning to the objective evidence part of this analysis, Justice O'Connor
opined that state legislatures and sentencing juries provided the most reliable,
objective evidence of how comtemporary society views a particular form of
punishment.12 5 Given the scant evidence as to how sentencing juries viewed the
execution of the mentally retarded, Justice O'Connor focused on the actions of
state legislatures and the federal government to provide objective evidence of
society's view of executing mentally retarded offenders. In 1989, Georgia and the
federal government had legislation explicitly exempting the mentally retarded
from the death penalty.126 Maryland also had enacted legislation barring the
execution of the mentally retarded, which went into effect one week after the
Court handed down Penry127 Justice O'Connor found these legislative actions
insufficient to show a national consensus that excluded the mentally retarded from
the death penalty even when the Georgia and Maryland statutory protections
were combined with the fourteen states that rejected the death penalty
completely. Moreover, Justice O'Connor was not persuaded by public opinion
polls and positions taken by major organizations such as the American
Association on Mental Retardation ("AAMR") that execution of the mentally
retarded was at odds with contemporary standards of decency. In this regard,
Justice O'Connor stated:
The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions may
ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of
contemporary values upon which we can rely. But at present, there is insufficient
evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people
convicted of capital offenses
for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by
1 28
the Eighth Amendment.

Having reached this determination with respect to the objective evidence,
Justice O'Connor turned to the second part of her Eighth Amendment analysis.
While recognizing that mental retardation "may diminish an individual's
culpability for a criminal act," and acknowledging that mental retardation was a
strong factor mitigating against imposition of the death penalty, Justice O'Connor
nonetheless found that:
On the record before the Court today,.. . I cannot conclude that all mentally
retarded people of Penry's ability-by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and
apart from any individualized consideration of their personal responsibilityinevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral
capacity to act with the degree of
29
culpability associated with the death penalty.1
Justice O'Connor thus found that "it cannot be said on the record before us today
that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of

125.
126.
127.
1989.
128.
129.

Id. at 331.
Id. at 334.
Id. Penry was handed down on June 26, 1989; the Maryland statute went into effect on July 1,
Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 (plurality).
Id. at 338.
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culpability associated with the death penalty.' 130 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor
concluded that at least in some circumstances, the imposition of the death penalty
on a mentally retarded criminal defendant could make a measurable contribution
to the penological goals of deterrence and retribution and that it was not
disproportionate to the crime.
Justice Scalia concurred with Justice O'Connor's ultimate result on this
question, but wrote separately setting out his analysis of the issue. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia adamantly stated that in determining whether a
punishment comports with the Eighth Amendment, the Court should look only at
how the state legislatures and the sentencing juries treat the issue.' 3 ' He opined
that unless it was clear after an objective examination of the laws and jury
determinations that the country had "set its face against" a particular form of
32
punishment, such punishment was not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
Although Justice Scalia referenced the Trop "evolving standard of decency" rule,
he did not discuss Gregg or the Eighth Amendment analysis it applied in death
penalty cases. 33 Justice Scalia then faulted Justice O'Connor for even discussing

whether the death penalty as applied to the mentally retarded defendant advanced
the goals of retribution and deterrence, or whether it was a proportionate penalty.
In Scalia's view, such analysis was unnecessary and had "no place in our Eighth
'
Amendment jurisprudence."134
This is consistent with Justice Scalia's apparent
belief that the Eighth Amendment does not preclude excessive sentences and that
it does not afford a proportionality review of punishment. 3 5
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan vigorously dissented
from the Court's decision on this issue. Citing evidence that persons with mental
retardation lack sufficient impulse control, moral reasoning, and understanding of
cause and effect, Justice Stevens concluded that the mentally retarded criminal
defendant did not meet the level of moral culpability that must be found to impose
the death penalty. 36 For this reason, Justice Stevens firmly and succinctly
determined that the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded
criminal defendant was unconstitutional.
Justice Brennan wrote separately to explain his reasons for finding the
execution of the mentally retarded constitutionally intolerable. In his dissent,
Justice Brennan focused on whether executing a defendant who was mentally

130. Id. at 338-39.
131. Id.
132. Penry, 492 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, White & Kennedy, JJ., Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
133. Although not discussed in the Penry decision, Justice Scalia has repeatedly criticized the
modern death jurisprudence that was set in motion by Gregg and its companion cases. Walton, 497
U.S. at 656-74 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Penry, 492 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, White & Kennedy, JJ., Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Scalia elaborated on his views on Eighth Amendment analysis in Stanford,
492 U.S. 361, which was decided the same day as Penry. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 670-73 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
135. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967.
136. Penry, 492 U.S. at 350 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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retarded was a disproportionate punishment, and whether it reasonably advanced
the goals of retribution and deterrence. 137 Like Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan
found that,
The impairment of a mentally retarded offender's reasoning abilities, control over
impulsive behavior, and moral development in my view limits his or her culpability
so that, whatever other punishment might be appropriate, the ultimate penalty of
death is always and necessarily
disproportionate to his or her blameworthiness and
38
hence is unconstitutional.'
Likewise, retribution, which requires that a criminal sentence must be directly
related to the defendant's personal culpability, cannot be served by executing a
mentally retarded offender whose moral blameworthiness is inherently limited by
his or her disability.139 Further, Justice Brennan reasoned, "It is highly unlikely
that the exclusion of the mentally retarded from the class of those eligible to be
sentenced to death will lessen any deterrent effect the death penalty may have for
nonretarded potential offenders."' 40 Brennan also found that the limitations of
mental retardation make it unlikely that other mentally retarded people would be
deterred from committing capital offenses.1 4' Even assuming, as Justice O'Connor
suggested, that some mentally retarded defendants were sufficiently
"blameworthy" and thus properly subject to the death penalty, Justice Brennan
concluded that the capital sentencing process provided an inadequate mechanism
to determine which mentally retarded defendant should be subject to the death
penalty. 112 Accordingly, Justice Brennan found that the execution of a mentally
retarded defendant violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
While the views of Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan did not persuade a
majority of Justices in 1989, Justice O'Connor hinted that her opinion might not
be written in stone. After finding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
did not extend its protection to mentally retarded defendants sentenced to death,
Justice O'Connor coyly suggested that "a national consensus against execution of
the mentally retarded may someday emerge reflecting the 'evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""1 3 It appeared that Justice
O'Connor was looking for greater evidence of a national consensus.
V.

LEGISLATIVE REACTION TO PENRY

Reaction to the Court's Penry decision was swift and strong. By the end of
2000, eleven more states, in addition to Maryland and Georgia, enacted legislation
to protect the mentally retarded from the death penalty. 4 Thus, by December of
137. Id. at 343-49 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Id. at 346.
139. Id. at 348.
140. Id.
141. Penry, 492 U.S. at 348-49 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Id. at 346-47.
143. Id. at 340 (plurality).
144. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618(b) (LEXIS L. Publg. 1993) ("No defendant with mental
retardation at the time of committing capital murder shall be sentenced to death"); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
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2000, thirteen death penalty states plus the federal government explicitly
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded criminal
defendants. In reaction to this changed legislative landscape, on March 26, 2001,
the Court granted certiorari in McCarver v. North Carolina14 to answer decide the
following issue:
Whether significant objective evidence demonstrates a societal consensus against
executing persons with mental retardation, reflecting that (a) such persons are not
sufficiently personally culpable to merit the death penalty, and (b) allowing
sentencers to weigh mental retardation as a mitigating factor in individual cases fails
to prevent the execution of persons whose vastly diminished culpability makes the
death penalty cruel and unusual.146
As the Court prepared to hear McCarver's case, the pace of legislative
change quickened. In early 2001, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and
North Carolina joined the procession of states that exclude the mentally retarded
from the death penalty.'47 Thus, eighteen death penalty states, plus the federal

16-9-403 (repealed 2002) ("A sentence of death shall not be imposed upon any defendant who is
determined to be a mentally retarded defendant pursuant to section 16-9-402. If any person who is
determined to be a mentally retarded defendant is found guilty of a class 1 felony, such defendant shall
be sentenced to life imprisonment"); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-1310) (1990 & Supp. 1994) ("In the trial of
any case in which the death penalty is sought which commences on or after July 1, 1988, should the
judge find in accepting a plea of guilty but mentally retarded or the jury or court find in its verdict that
the defendant is guilty of the crime charged but mentally retarded, the death penalty shall not be
imposed and the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life"); Ind. Code § 35-36-9-6
(Supp. 1994) ("If the court determines that the defendant is a mentally retarded individual under
section 5 of this chapter, the part of the state's charging instrument filed under IC 35-50-2-9(a) that
seeks a death sentence against the defendant shall be dismissed."); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4623(d) (Supp.
1994) ("If, at the conclusion of a hearing pursuant to this section, the court determines that the
defendant is mentally retarded, the court shall sentence the defendant as otherwise provided by law,
and no sentence of death shall be imposed hereunder"); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.140(1) (1990) ("no
offender who has been determined to be a seriously mentally retarded offender under the provisions of
KRS 532.135, shall be subject to execution"); Md. Code Ann. art. 27, § 412(g)(1) (repealed 2002) ("If a
person found guilty of murder in the first degree was, at the time the murder was committed, less than
18 years old or if the person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the person was, at the
time the murder was committed, mentally retarded, the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole and may not be sentenced to death");
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.01(2) (1997) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty
shall not be imposed upon any person with mental retardation"); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2.1(B)
(1994) ("The penalty of death shall not be imposed on any person who is mentally retarded"); N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27(12)(c) (McKinney 1995) ("In the event the defendant is sentenced pursuant
to this section to death, the court shall thereupon render a finding with respect to whether the
defendant is mentally retarded. If the court finds the defendant is mentally retarded, the court shall set
aside the sentence of death and sentence the defendant either to life imprisonment without parole or to
a term of imprisonment for the class A-I felony of murder in the first degree other than a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole"); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 23A-27A-26.1 (2000) ("Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the death penalty may not be imposed upon any person who was mentally
retarded at the time of the commission of the offense and whose mental retardation was manifested
and documented before the age of eighteen years."); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(b) (1991 & Supp.
1994) ("Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no defendant with mental retardation at
the time of committing first degree murder shall be sentenced to death"); Wash. Rev. Code §
10.95.030(2) (Supp. 1995) ("In no case, however, shall a person be sentenced to death if the person was
mentally retarded at the time the crime was committed").
145. 532 U.S. 941 (2001).
146. Pet.'s Br. for Cert., McCarver v. N.C., 2001 WL 726608 (June 8, 2001).
147. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-703.02(H) (2001) ("If the trial court finds that the defendant has
mental retardation, the trial court shall dismiss the intent to seek the death penalty, shall not impose a

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2002

19

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 38 [2002], Iss. 2, Art. 4
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:299

government, barred the execution of the mentally retarded. Significantly, at the
time that Thompson was decided, eighteen death penalty states had enacted

legislation that, at a minimum, protected fifteen-year-olds from the death penalty.
Also while McCarver's case was pending, the Texas Legislature passed a bill to
ban the execution of mentally retarded criminal defendants. Even though voicing

approval of the bill, the Governor of Texas refused to sign the legislation because
he did not believe that there were any mentally retarded defendants sitting on
death row in Texas. 148 In 2001 and in early 2002, the legislatures of Virginia,
Nevada, and Illinois had legislation pending to outlaw the execution of the
mentally retarded.'49

These legislative changes were a welcome sign for the advocates of mentally
retarded defendants who wanted the Court to reverse the Penry decision.
However, the North Carolina legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally

retarded defendants rendered McCarver's case moot. Accordingly, on September
29, 2001, the Court dismissed McCarver's writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. 50 This dismissal did not mean the end of the issue. On October 1, 2001,
the Court granted a writ of certiorari filed by Darryl Renard Atkins limited to the
question of whether the execution of mentally retarded individuals convicted of
capital crimes violates the Eighth Amendment.' 5
VI.

IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

ON DARRYL RENARD ATKINS: ATKINS V. VIRGINIA

On August 16, 1996, Atkins and William Jones abducted Eric Nesbit, robbed
him, drove him to an isolated area, and murdered him. 152 Atkins and Jones were

sentence of death on the defendant if the defendant is convicted of first degree murder"); Conn. Gen.
Stat. §§ 53a-46a(h) (2001) ("The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the
jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e), that at the
time of the offense (1) the defendant was under the age of eighteen years, or (2) the defendant was a
person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, or (3) the defendant's mental capacity was
significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to conform the defendant's conduct to the
requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a
defense to prosecution, or (4) the defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a10 for the offense, which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation in such offense
was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (5) the
defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the course of
commission of the offense of which the defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave
risk of causing, death to another person."); Fla. Stat. § 921.137(2) (Supp. 2002) ("A sentence of death
may not be imposed upon a defendant convicted of a capital felony if it is determined in accordance
with this section that the defendant has mental retardation."); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030(4) (Supp. 2002)
(death penalty may not be imposed where it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant is mentally retarded); 2001 N.C. Laws 346 (providing that a mentally retarded person
convicted of first degree murder shall not be sentenced to death).
148. Raymond Bonner, Argument Escalates on Executing Retarded, N.Y. Times (July 23, 2001);
Mark Babineck, Perry: Death-Penalty Measure Needs Analyzing "We Do Not Execute the Mentally
Retarded," Dallas Morning News 27A (May 31, 2001).
149. Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2249 n. 17.
150. McCarverv. N.C., 533 U.S. 975 (2001).
151. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. 2242.
152. Id. at 2244.
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To escape the death penalty, Jones
arrested and charged with capital murder.
pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against Atkins.154 At Atkins' trial, Williams
related the events leading up to Nesbit's murder and told the jury that Atkins was
the one who did the actual killing. Atkins also testified and told the jury that
Williams was the one who killed Nesbit. The jury apparently found Williams
more credible and convicted Atkins of first-degree murder. During the sentencing
phase of the trial, the jury found the existence of two aggravating circumstances,
which were not outweighed by the mitigating evidence, and sentenced Atkins to
death.'55 Atkins appealed his conviction and sentence to the Virginia Supreme
Court, which remanded the case for a second sentencing proceeding. Atkins was
again sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed this sentence.
According to the expert witness called by the defense at both sentencing
116
In
proceedings, Atkins suffers from mild mental retardation with an IQ of 59.
addition, Atkins' school records indicated that he did very poorly in school and
that he was considered "slow," which was consistent with the diagnosis of mental
retardation. 157 At the second sentencing hearing, the state also produced an
expert witness, Dr. Stanton Samenow, to testify regarding Atkins' mental
capabilities. The expert did not perform any IQ tests on Atkins, but based on an
interview and a review of Atkins' school records, he concluded that Atkins was of
average intelligence. It does not appear that the jury explicitly decided whether
Atkins was mentally retarded although it did sentence him to death. 58
In reviewing Atkins's second appeal of his death sentence, a majority of the
Supreme Court of Virginia noted the conflicting testimony regarding Atkins'
mental abilities and raised questions about the mental retardation diagnosis.5 In
particular, the court indicated that there was no showing that Atkins suffered from
at least two adaptive skill deficits. This finding is somewhat curious since Atkins
failed to function in an academic setting, and also apparently failed to hold a job
and did not live on his own. The court, nonetheless, affirmed Atkins' death
sentence without affirmatively determining whether he was in fact mentally
retarded. 16°
Two Justices of the Virginia Supreme Court dissented. The dissenting
justices excoriated the findings of the commonwealth's mental health expert.
Indeed, Justice Hassell wrote, "I simply place no credence whatsoever in Dr.
Samenow's opinion that the defendant possesses at least average intelligence. I

153. Id. at 2245 n. 1.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2245.
156. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2245.
157. Id.
158. Atkins v. Commw., 534 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 2000), rev'd, sub nom.Atkins v. Va., 122 S. Ct. 2242
(2002).
159. Atkins, 534 S.E. 2d at 320-21.
160. Id.
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would hold that Dr. Samenow's opinion that
the defendant possesses average
161
intelligence is incredulous as a matter of law.,
While it was abundantly clear to both dissenting justices that Atkins was
mentally retarded, a majority of the Virginia Supreme Court raised questions,
albeit somewhat dubious, about the diagnosis. Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, acknowledged the conflicting evidence as to Atkins' mental capacity, but
stated, "Because of the gravity of the concerns expressed by the dissenters, and in
light of the dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape that has occurred in the
past 13 years, we162 granted certiorari to revisit the issue that we first addressed in
the Penry case."'
Unlike the first time the Supreme Court tackled this issue, this time, Justice
Stevens, one of the Penry dissenters, wrote the majority opinion. Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens'
decision. As noted earlier, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy both ruled against
Penry's cruel and unusual punishment claim. 163 In Penry, as detailed above,
Justice O'Connor separately set out her reasons for rejecting Penry's cruel and
unusual punishment claim; Justice Kennedy had joined Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion. Clearly, the implicit limitations of the mentally retarded had not changed
in the previous thirteen years; the pivotal change, at least for Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy, must have been the dramatic legislative changes in the wake of
Penry. Justices Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer, who also joined the majority
opinion, did not sit on the Supreme Court at the time of the Penry decision. In
Atkins, unlike Penry, none of the Justices in the majority issued concurring
opinions, thus indicating the strength of Justice Stevens' analysis of this issue.
In setting out the analysis to be applied to Atkins' cruel and unusual
punishment claim, Justice Stevens stated plainly that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited "excessive sanctions," which included punishments as well as fines, and
reiterated the well-established "evolving standards of decency" analysis. In accord
with this view, Justice Stevens made clear that a proportionality review was
constitutionally required in an Eighth Amendment analysis, stating, "We
explained 'that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to the offense.' We have repeatedly applied this
proportionality precept in later cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment."' 64 In
affirmatively stating that there is a proportionality component to the Eighth
Amendment, Justice Stevens cited to Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Harmelin v. Michigan.16 Justice Scalia's view that there is no proportionality
component to the Eighth Amendment appears to have been flatly rejected by six
166
members of the Court.

161. Id. at 323 (Hassell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2246.
See supra n. 122 and accompanying text.
Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2246 (citations omitted).
Id. (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957).
See supra nn. 7, 22.
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In performing this constitutionally mandated proportionality review, Justice
Stevens then stated, "Proportionality review under those evolving standards
should be informed by 'objective factors to the maximum possible extent,"' which
means an examination of the actions of legislatures across the country. 167 Clearly,
the "objective criteria," i.e., the legislative decisions of the states, had changed
dramatically in the thirteen years since Penry. Moreover, while Atkins was
pending before the Court, the change in favor of legislatively protecting the
mentally retarded from the death penalty continued at a brisk pace. By the time
the Court decided Atkins, eighteen death penalty states prohibited the execution
of the mentally retarded and several other death penalty states, including Virginia,
had legislation pending that would likewise outlaw the execution of the mentally
retarded. According to Justice Stevens, this objective evidence was significant not
merely as evidence of the number of states that had enacted legislation to protect
the mentally retarded, but also as evidence of the consistency in the trend to
extend such protection. 68 In so doing, Justice Stevens neatly sidestepped setting
an absolute number of death penalty states that when combined with the nondeath penalty states would establish a national consensus sufficient to
constitutionally prohibit the death penalty under certain circumstances. Thus, it
cannot be said absolutely that "eighteen" is the magic number of death penalty
states required to form a national consensus sufficient to exempt a class of
individuals from the death penalty. However, when considered in conjunction
with Thompson, a showing that eighteen death penalty states legislatively prohibit
the imposition of the death penalty on a particular group of persons would be, at a
minimum, strong probative evidence that the country has found a particular form
of punishment to be outside the society's standards of decency.
Justice Stevens also noted that execution of the mentally retarded is
disfavored by the leading national organizations that work with the mentally
retarded, as well as the international community. Public opinion polls also have
shown disapproval of the practice. These factors support the conclusion that
evolving standards of decency abhor the imposition of the death penalty on the
mentally retarded. In addition, Justice Stevens noted that only five mentally
retarded capital defendants had been executed, indicating that the punishment
was unusual. 169 This observation is subject to dispute, and Justice Scalia seized on
the weakness of this point in his dissent."7 Although Justice Stevens' finding on
this point may be open to attack, it was not the controlling factor in his Eighth
Amendment national consensus analysis.
Justice Stevens, however, did not end his analysis by simply counting the
number of states that exempted, or that had legislation pending to exempt, the
mentally retarded from the death penalty. Indeed, in keeping with the Court's
traditional Eighth Amendment analysis, Justice Stevens also analyzed the
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 2247 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 2249.
Id.
Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2264 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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imposition of the death penalty on Atkins to determine whether it advanced either
the goal of retribution or deterrence, and to determine if it was excessive."' As he
found in 1989, and echoing the reasoning discussed in Justice Brennan's Penry
dissent, Justice Stevens found that neither retribution nor deterrence was
advanced by executing a mentally retarded criminal defendant such as Atkins.
First, the limited capabilities of the mentally retarded defendant lessens his moral
culpability. To impose the death penalty on such an individual defeats the idea
that the death penalty is to be meted out only to those who are sufficiently morally
culpable. Second, Justice Stevens found that executing a mentally retarded person
would not deter non-retarded defendants who are unaffected by a ban on the
execution of mentally retarded defendants. Nor would it deter mentally retarded
defendants, who lack the intellectual capacity to understand the consequences
attendant to capital crimes. Thus, imposing the death penalty on a mentally
retarded defendant does not advance the legitimate penological goals of the death
172
penalty.
Additionally, Justice Stevens expressed concern that the mentally retarded
defendant faces a heightened risk of wrongful conviction because of the greater
risk of a false confession combined with a decreased ability to effectively assist
their attorneys.'73 Over the past few years, increased attention has been focused
on innocent criminal defendants who are sentenced to death. Significant national
concern about the issue has been demonstrated, in part, by the moratorium on the
death penalty in Illinois and the calls for a moratorium by the American Bar
Association. 174 Justice O'Connor, in particular, has voiced concerns over this
problem: "In July of 2001, Justice O'Connor publicly stated that the number of
recently freed death row inmates suggests that 'the system may well be allowing
some innocent defendants to be executed."" 7 As discussed earlier, the mental
limitations and attributes of the mentally retarded defendants create an increased
risk that they will not understand the Miranda warnings, that they will confess to
crimes that they did not commit,6 or that they will accept greater responsibility for
17
criminal acts than they should.
In light of these concerns, and based on the objective evidence and the wellaccepted modern Eighth Amendment analysis of the death penalty, Justice
Stevens concluded:
Our independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with the
judgment of "the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter" and
171. Id. at 2251.
172. Although neither Justice O'Connor nor Kennedy shared this view with respect to mentally
retarded capital defendants in 1989, both Justices adhered to this aspect of Justice Stevens' analysis
without issuing a separate opinion on this issue.
173. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
174. See Coyne & Entzeroth, supra n. 64.
175. Anne-Marie Moyes, Student Author, Assessing the Risk of Executing the Innocent: A Case for
Allowing Access to Physical Evidence for Posthumous DNA Testing, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 953, 990 (2002)
(quoting David G. Savage, '92 Execution Haunts Death Penalty Foes; Activists Fight for DNA Test in
Hopes of Bolstering Doubts on Capital Punishment, L.A. Times Al (July 22, 2001)).
176. See supra nn. 96-99.
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concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.

We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will
measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty.
Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our "evolving

standards of decency," we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and
that the Constitution "places a substantive
77 restriction on the State's power to take
the life" of a mentally retarded offender.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas bitterly dissented
in Atkins. Foreshadowing the ultimate conclusion in Atkins and their impending
caustic dissents in that case was an acerbic dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, to a 2002 decision to grant a stay of
execution. In Moore v. Texas,' 78 a Texas death row inmate asserted he was
mentally retarded and asked the Court for a stay of execution pending its decision
in Atkins. The thrust of Justice Scalia's dissent to the stay of execution was that
Moore was procedurally barred from raising this claim in a post-conviction
proceeding. 179 However, the tone and the timing of the dissent made it evident
that Justice Scalia was frustrated by the petitioner's claim and the Court.
In Atkins, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia issued separate
written dissents. While agreeing with the points made by Justice Scalia in his
dissent-including the claim that the majority opinion was nothing more than a
rationalization of six Justices' views of what the law should be-Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote separately to express his outrage over the majority's reference to,
and reliance on, international law, the viewpoints of professional organizations,
and public opinion polls in making its Eighth Amendment analysis. 80 Not only
did Chief Justice Rehnquist find that this evidence was not sufficiently "objective"
to serve as a basis for discerning a national consensus, but he also stated that
reliance on such evidence was antithetical to the principles of federalism.18'
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist objected to any reliance on international law
in discerning the nation's consensus and stated that reliance on international law
182
was inconsistent with the Court's plurality opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky.
However, the Court has considered international law in its Eighth Amendment
analysis in Thompson,183 Enmund, 84 Coker,185 and Trop.18 6 Only Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas appear to view any reference to
international law as completely at odds with an Eighth Amendment analysis. The

177. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
178. 122 S. Ct. 2350 (2002).
179. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
180. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2253-54.
182. Id. at 2252-53 (discussing Stanford, 492 U.S. 361). The reliance on international law in the
context of discerning the evolving standards of decency of the Eighth Amendment was also criticized
by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Thompson, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n. 4 (1988).
183. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31.
184. 458 U.S. 782, 796 n. 22 (1982).
185. 433 U.S. at 596 n. 10.
186. 356 U.S. at 101, 102 n. 35.
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protestations of these three Justices notwithstanding, the brief reference to
international law by Justice Stevens in the majority opinion in Atkins is not a
departure from established Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 87 Indeed, there is
a strong argument to be made that the framers of the Constitution relied on
international law in drafting the Eighth
Amendment, which uses language nearly
188
identical to the British Bill of Rights.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also argued that public opinion polls were not
sufficiently "objective" to support a finding of cruel and unusual punishment
because polls can be manipulated, at least to some extent, based on the form and
content of the questions. However, even assuming the validity of Rehnquist's
complaint about public opinion polls, the opinion polls, nonetheless, appear to
accurately reflect the wave of legislation outlawing the execution of the mentally
retarded. It was the extent and momentum of this legislation that swayed the
majority rather than simply the public opinion polls. Finally, Rehnquist criticized
the majority's reference to the opinions of religious organizations and professional
organizations such as the AAMR. According to him, "none [of the opinions of
these groups] should be accorded any weight on the Eight[h] Amendment scale
when the elected representatives of a State's populace have not deemed them
persuasive enough to prompt legislative action.' ' 89 However, it is precisely the
efforts and views of such organizations that prompted eighteen death penalty
states to enact legislation protecting mentally retarded defendants and caused at
least three more states to have legislation pending when the Court handed down
Atkins. Indeed, these organizations in states from New York to Arizona
successfully engaged their state legislators to bring an end to a form of punishment
the organizations viewed as abhorrent. Contrary to Rehnquist's suggestion, to
consider the views of such groups does not seem to offend the democratic process
or to be antithetical to the values of federalism, especially in light of the fact that
state legislatures across the country have given effect to these views.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia launched a vicious attack on the majority
opinion, injecting phrases such as "the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to
fabricate 'national consensus,"" 9 and "[t]he Court pays lipservice to these
precedents as it miraculously extracts a 'national consensus' forbidding execution
of the mentally retarded."' 9' As noted earlier, in Penry, Justice Scalia stated his
belief that an Eighth Amendment inquiry must be limited to an examination of
the actions of state legislatures and sentencing juries. In Atkins, Justice Scalia
deconstructs the actions of the eighteen death penalty states that forbid execution

187. For a compelling and interesting discussion of the importance of international law in analyzing
the Eighth Amendment and the death penalty, see Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to
World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 1085 (2002).
188. See id. at 1087-97 (discussing the reference to and reliance on international law and opinion in
drafting the Constitution).
189. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2255 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2264 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2261.
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of the mentally retarded and ignores altogether the views of legislators in nondeath penalty states. 192
Justice Scalia would only concede that seven states had enacted legislation
completely banning the execution of the mentally retarded because legislation in
eleven states did not expressly provide for retroactive application of the exclusion
of mentally retarded criminal defendants. However, he failed to mention that
although the Tennessee statute prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded did
not provide for retroactive application, the Tennessee Supreme Court has
retroactively applied that statute to those mentally retarded persons who were
already sitting on death row at the time the statute was enacted.1 93 Moreover, to
the extent Justice Scalia grudgingly considers eighteen death penalty states as
exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty, Justice Scalia finds this
number insufficient to form a national consensus.
Although Justice Scalia accurately pointed to other cases, such Edmund and
Coker, in which a larger number of states had repudiated the death penalty in
certain cases, he failed to mention Thompson, in which a plurality of the Court
found eighteen states sufficient to form a national consensus. Justice Scalia
further argued that the current legislation is too "new" to be considered probative
of a national consensus, but never shed light on how "old" legislation would have
to be in order to be indicative of a national consensus.
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia also criticized Justice Stevens' Eighth
Amendment analysis for considering whether the death penalty serves the goals of
retribution and deterrence. Justice Scalia found this analysis inappropriate, as he
had stated previously.
Moreover, Justice Scalia stated that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit excessive punishment or require proportionate
punishments.'94 Justice Scalia's view on proportionate sentences, which appears to
run counter to well-entrenched, modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 95 has
clearly been rejected by six of the current Justices on the Supreme Court. He
further rejected the Court's findings with respect to the moral blameworthiness of
the mentally retarded and the deterrent effect of executing the mentally retarded.
In his final remarks in Atkins, Justice Scalia echoed a theme that he has
maintained in other death penalty cases and which underlies his ideology in this
context. Simply put, Justice Scalia found the Court's entire death penalty
jurisprudence as set out in Gregg and its progeny to be wrong. Justice Scalia
writes:
Today's opinion adds one more to the long list of substantive and procedural
requirements impeding imposition of the death penalty imposed under this Court's
assumed power to invent a death-is-different jurisprudence. None of those
requirements existed when the Eighth Amendment was adopted, and some of them
were not even supported by current moral consensus. They include prohibition of

192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 2262-64.
Van Tran v. St., 66 S.W.3d 790, 811 (Tenn. 2001).
See Justice Scalia's opinion in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-90.
Indeed, even the Magna Carta recognized the inherent justice in proportionate sentences.
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the death penalty for "ordinary" murder, for rape of an adult woman, and for felony
murder absent a showing that the defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state
of mind; prohibition of the death penalty for any person under the age of 16 at the
time of the crime; prohibition of the death penalty as the mandatory punishment for
any crime; a requirement that the sentencer not be given unguided discretiona
requirement, that the sentencer be empowered to take into account all mitigating
circumstances; and a requirement that the accused receive a judicial evaluation of
his claim of insanity before the sentence can be executed. There is something to be
said for popular abolition of the death penalty; there is nothing to be said for its
incremental abolition by this Court. 196
Moreover, Justice Scalia conjectured that exempting the mentally retarded

will cause greater mischief than the other procedural and substantive safeguards
that have been established in accord with the Court's modern death penalty

jurisprudence.

In the wake of Atkins, he predicts a flood of "feigned" mental

retardation claims that will allow death row inmates to escape the ultimate

punishment of death. 197
VII. QUESTIONS ARISING AFTER A TKINS

Clearly, Justice Scalia fears a floodgate has been opened by Atkins. Whether
the mischief portended by Justice Scalia emerges or not, several questions do
seem imminent in light of the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the
death penalty on the mentally retarded criminal defendant. Among the questions

raised by Atkins are whether the decision will be applied retroactively and what
standard will be applied in determining whether a capital defendant is mentally
retarded.
A.

Retroactive Application of Atkins

By all accounts, there are mentally retarded criminal defendants currently
sitting on death row across the country whose convictions and sentences became
final before the Supreme Court ruled in Atkins. In seeking relief on the basis of
Atkins, courts will have to consider whether Atkins is to be applied retroactively to
these inmates. Justice Stevens did not address this issue in the majority opinion.

However, it is evident that a majority of the Court in Penry would apply a
constitutional rule exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty
retroactively. As Justice O'Connor made clear in Penry:
In Teague [v. Lane], we concluded that a new rule will not be applied retroactively
to defendants on collateral review unless it falls within one of two exceptions....
[T]he first exception set forth in Teague should be understood to cover not only
rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules
prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of
their status or offense. Thus, if we held, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry

196. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2267 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., Rehnquist, C.I., dissenting) (citations omitted).
197. Id. at 2267-68.
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regardless of the procedures followed, such a rule would fall under the first
exception to the general rule1 98of nonretroactivity and would be applicable to
defendants on collateral review.

Moreover, prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins, the Tennessee
Supreme Court retroactively applied its statutory prohibition on execution of the
mentally retarded. Thus, it seems evident that Atkins should be applied
retroactively.199
B.

Standardfor Reviewing Claims of Mental Retardation

While it is clear that mentally retarded criminal defendants cannot be
executed, the tasks of determining who is mentally retarded and how a jury is to
make that determination falls to the states. Although the Court did not set forth
the standard for determining mental retardation, the DSM-IV definition of mental
retardation, 200 or a test similar to it, would presumably pass constitutional muster.
It is unclear, however, if a more burdensome test would survive Atkins. For
example, in Arkansas there is a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation
when a defendant has an IQ of 65 or below.2 1 The fate of this standard is less
clear.
Moreover, the states that lacked legislation to protect the mentally retarded
will now have to enact rules to apply in cases where mentally retarded individuals
face the death penalty. For example, prior to Atkins, Oklahoma did not prohibit
execution of the mentally retarded, although two of the judges on the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Oklahoma Constitution prohibited the
practice. 20220 On September 4, 2002, in Murphy v. State,2 °3 the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals set forth the standard for Oklahoma courts to employ in
determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded and thus subject to the
death penalty.
Aspects of Murphy reflect some of the many issues that may emerge as
states craft their death penalty exemption for mental retardation. First, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the determination of mental
retardation will be made during the capital sentencing proceeding rather than in a
separate proceeding before trial. Two judges vigorously dissented to this
approach, noting that the question of mental retardation was an issue of deatheligibility. As Judge Chapel observed, "In order to assure that the trial [to
determine mental retardation] is not tainted with capital stage evidence which can
only improperly appeal to jurors' emotions and passions (being irrelevant to any
sentencing issue), I would require the trial court to settle the issue before the trial
198. Penry, 492 U.S. at 329-30 (plurality) (citations omitted).
199. Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 811.
200. DSM-IV, supra n. 3, at 39.

201. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (LEXIS L. Publg. 1997).
202. See Hammon v. St., 999 P.2d 1082, 1102 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (Strubhar & Chapel, JJ.,
dissenting); Lambert v. St., 984 P.2d 221, 240-43 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (Chapel, J.,
concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
203. 54 P.3d 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
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begins." 2°4 Moreover, determining this issue before trial will reduce costs to the
judicial system by obviating unnecessary capital sentencing proceedings in cases in
which a defendant is mentally retarded and hence ineligible for the death
sentence.
Second, the Murphy court also indicated that the question of mental
retardation could be waived if a defendant did not raise it on direct appeal. Not
only does this part of the opinion appear, at the minimum, inconsistent with the
Penry retroactivity analysis, it is also inconceivable that a defendant could waive
the imposition of an illegal sentence. As Judge Chapel noted, "[T]his issue of
death-eligibility is fundamental.... I do not believe this Court can or should force
the use of procedural waiver to prevent these claims."2 °5
Finally, while employing a standard of mental retardation similar to the one
used by the DSM-IV, the Murphy court indicated that to be found mentally
retarded a defendant must score below seventy on an IQ test administered after
the crime, and that no person shall be deemed mentally retarded unless he scores
below 70 on a contemporary test. Such a standard, while technically comporting
with Atkins, appears to be designed to assure that the mentally retarded will be
sentenced to death rather than protecting these disabled persons from this
penalty. It is evident that as states craft and refine their standards for determining
mental retardation, there will be further questions and issues to be litigated.
VIII. EPILOGUE
At the time the Court issued Atkins, Penry was in the middle of his third resentencing proceeding before a Texas jury. In light of the Atkins decision, the trial
court instructed the jury that it was to make a determination as to whether Penry
was mentally retarded, and if the jury found he was mentally retarded, it was to
impose a sentence less than death. The jury found that Penry was not mentally
retarded. He was again sentenced to death.
Atkins' case has been remanded to the Virginia courts for further
proceedings.

204. Id. at 575-76 (Chapel, J., concurring in result).
205. Id. at 575.
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